The daily rebalancing of a leveraged exchange traded fund(LETF) requires the fund manager to systematically modify the amount of index exposure. In order to achieve the investment objective of the fund, managers of LETFs use total return swaps with the appropriate leverage ratio. This daily rebalancing may open the possibility of front-running and other market frictions. We constructed shorting trades in order to capture any existing slippage resulting from the daily rebalancing of LETFs. Our data unequivocally shows that the cumulative effect of rebalancing costs cannot be ignored. For holding periods of one day, even after accounting for compounding costs, LETFs fail to perform as expected.
Introduction
It is difficult to accurately measure market impact 2 caused by daily rebalancing.
Here, one can compare the daily returns of the leveraged fund to β times the daily returns of an unleveraged ETF tracking the same underlying index. Fees and management costs are somewhat important when determining the profitability of these funds, but are generally much smaller than the effects we seek to capture here.
All indications show that LETFs have negative overnight expected returns when compared to the benchmark. As we shall argue, this is most likely due to "inefficiencies" associated with hedging by the manager. Note that this is not connected with convexity effects for LETFs reported in other papers (Avellaneda, Zhang (2009) ; Madhavan, Cheng (2009)). Rather, this is due to market impact caused by active management as studied by Tang and Xu (Tang, Xu (2011) ). Essentially, the size and the direction of daily rebalancing is based on public information. This information could be used by market participants in ways which cause further slippage of LETF returns from their expected returns.
Initially, it was our goal to formulate a mathematical model to capture the inefficiencies produced by LETFs. We hypothesized that the loss in expected return for LETFs is proportional to the volatility of the underlying index and inversely proportional to the average trading volume of the underlying index. Yet, this model proved too mechanical for describing the inefficiencies the market produces. We tried correlating volatility to impact and found no significant relation. Likewise with the other variables in the model.
So that classical mechanical impact models (Cont, Stoikov, Kukanov (2012) ) are too crude and cannot always explain market impact. But, we find that periods that are very volatile usually give rise to large under-performance. It is on these empirical results that the paper focuses.
Another very important factor in determining the economics of shorting LETFs are borrowing costs. Most LETFs are hard to borrow with often very limited availability of stocks and high borrow rates. In fact, the typical fee for borrowing 3 is on the order of 200-600 basis points, whereas management fees range from 75-95 basis points. We believe that the main reason for such large borrow fees is due to the daily market impact incurred by LETFs which induce arbitrageurs to short these funds and to hedge exposure 4 .
Managing LETFs; Buy High, Sell Low
We develop a framework in order to better understand how LETF managers rebalance their daily exposure to the underlying index. For this purpose, consider a hypothetical 3 In the sense that fee = fed funds -short rate. 4 For a popularized discussion of this topic refer to (Light (2012) ). market with an index or ETF and a LETF with leverage ratio β. We use discrete time with ∆t equal to 1 day and denote the price of the LETF at date t by L t . Due to the product design, the LETF is supposed to have a return which is equal to β times the return of the underlying index over any one day. The manager achieves his desired exposure by using total return swaps. The relevant diagram for this transaction is depicted below. Note that all costs of hedging are ultimately transferred to the fund.
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We give two examples to demonstrate this process. Suppose that the LETF has β = 2, an underlying index value of $100 and one billion dollars (denoted $1B) of AUM.
Consider the following scenario: • The manager begins (Day 0) long $2B TRS hedged by the swap counterparty.
• On Day 1, the index drops by 10 percent to $90, so the value of AUM drops to $1B×(1 − 2 × .1) = $800M. On Day 1 the manager needs an exposure of 2 × $800M=$1600M.
• The notional value of the TRS from Day 0 has become $2000M×(1− .1) = $1800M giving an exposure of $1800M before adjustment. Thus, the swap counterparty must sell (go short stock synthetically) $1800M-$1600M=$200M of TRS.
• On Day 3, the index rises by 10 percent to $99, so the value of AUM grows to $800M×(1 + 2 × .1) = $960M, which means the manager needs an exposure of 2 × $960M=$1920M. The notional value of the TRS from Day 1 has become $1600M ×(1 + .1) = $1760M giving an exposure before adjustment of $1760M.
• Hence, to achieve the desired exposure of $1920M the swap counterparty must buy (go long stock synthetically) $1920M-$1760M=$160M of TRS.
For the sake of completeness, we also consider the inverse LETF and suppose that now the LETF has β = −2. As before, we have an initial index value of $100 and $1B of AUM. Table 2 :
90 1200 -2400 -1800 -600 2 99 960 -1920 -2640 +720
1 $M denotes dollars in millions. For simplicity, we assume the overnight interest rate on AUM is zero. 2 A negative sign denotes selling and a positive sign denotes buying.
• The manager begins (Day 0) short $2B TRS hedged by the swap counterparty.
• On Day 1, the index drops by 10 percent to $90, so the value of AUM grows to $1000M×(1 + 2 × .1) = $1200M, which means the manager needs an exposure of −2 × $1200M= -$2400M.
• The notional value of the TRS from Day 0 has become −$2000M×(1 − .1) = −$1800M giving an exposure of $1800M short. Thus, the swap counterparty must sell (go short stock synthetically) $2400M−$1800M=$600M of TRS.
• On Day 3, the index rises by 10 percent to $99, so the value of AUM drops to $1200M×(1 − 2 × .1) = $960M, which means the manager needs an exposure of −2 × $960M=-$1920M. The notional value of the TRS from Day 1 has become −$2400M ×(1 + .1) = −$2640M giving an exposure of $2640M short.
• Hence, to achieve the desired exposure of $1920M short the swap counterparty must buy (go long stock synthetically) $2640M-$1920M=$720M of TRS.
These examples illustrate a fundamental feature of LETFs; the fund always rebalances in the same direction as the underlying index regardless of whether it is a bullish or a bearish leveraged fund 5 . In other words, in this active management strategy, the fund always buys high and sells low.
We believe that when the swap counterparty rebalances the TRS it will incur an impact 6 which is passed on to the fund along with the swap dealer's fees 7 . We derive a formula for calculating the adjustment needed to rebalance a leveraged fund. In general,
denote by E t the AUM of the LETF at time t. Also, let S t denote the price of the underlying index at time t. The profit and loss (P&L) corresponding to trading one share of the underlying index is given by:
where r denotes the daily risk-free interest rate and the time-step ∆t is one day. Now, let n t 8 denote the number of shares of the underlying index held as a hedge at time t.
The corresponding P&L of the total number of shares is thus given by:
Maintaining a constant leverage β is equivalent to verifying the following equation holds at the beginning of each time period:
This equation relates the AUM and the number of shares which should be held at time t. The P&L of the fund comes from the change in value of the TRS position and the interest accumulated on AUM 9 :
Expanding equation 1 and using the fact that E t = ntSt β ultimately gives 10 :
These equations confirm our initial observation that maintaining a constant leverage obliges the LETF manager to buy high and sell low. In particular, both the long and the short leveraged ETFs always rebalance in the same direction as the market.
A Model for Slippage
Due to systematic adjustment of the swap notional, we argue that LETFs should have negative expected returns with respect to the underlying benchmark. The market knows the exact direction and the exact size of the hedge; which is somewhat analogous to a market participant announcing ahead of time a large market order.
We began our analysis with the expectation that the change in value of the leveraged fund due to temporary market impact should be given by:
additional change caused by daily rebalancing .
In equation 3, µ t is a positive number and t is a mean-zero noise term. We represent slippage at time t by (µ t + t ). If the manager does not rebalance daily to maintain 9 Usually held in cash. 10 See Appendix A1 for full derivation.
constant leverage, we would expect the change in AUM of the fund to read as in equation 1. Since this is not the case, we expect the change in AUM to also reflect the impact the manager produces by rebalancing, hence the true change in AUM should be as in equation 3. Dividing through by E t in equation 3 and rearranging terms gives:
So that the difference between the actual return of the fund and the expected return of the fund is given by the daily slippage term −µ t − t .
Empirical Results for Slippage
We give very strong empirical evidence for the existence of slippage for LETFs. There are several ways to capture slippage. If we short both the bullish LETF and the bearish LETF we should be able to capture some portion of the resulting slippage, 11 while remaining market-neutral. For those LETFs for which an underlying index exists, we 11 Mathematically, it is easy to check that this quantity is given by (µ1 + µ2) + (
Where the indexes correspond to each LETF. 12 We go long |β| times the underlying and short the bullish LETF or short |β| times the underlying and short the bearish LETF.
annual slippage. It is on this annual data that we computed the statistical results shown in table 3. The notation used for each pair trade is in the form A/B and should be read as going long A and shorting B. In the case where an underlying index exists, we use the same notation to mean that we long/short |β| of the underlying index and short the corresponding LETF.
As can be seen from table 3 each of the 21 pair-trades has positive mean and median slippage. Furthermore, all of the 95 percent confidence intervals about the mean contain only positive slippage values and in particular, they do not contain zero. Hence, the existence of slippage for these trades is unequivocal. We also performed the same dataanalysis for monthly (20-days) running slippage and found similar results, in that all of the 95-percent confidence intervals for each trade are strictly positive. Thus, there is very noticeable and significant slippage for this trade duration as well.
It is important to mention here that if the duration for these trades is just a single day, then there is no observable slippage. The reason for this comes from the t term in the expression for slippage. Since t is a mean-zero noise term, intra-day the variance of t is large and the trade will not be able to capture slippage since the mean-zero attribute of t will not be utilized 13 . Hence, it is important to consider these trades over multiple days in order to capture slippage. In addition to these results, we also tested for serial correlation among the daily slippage values and found that for each trade the data does not display autocorrelation 14 . In other words, the t 's for each trade are uncorrelated.
13 Since we won't be adding them, the law of large numbers will not take effect. 14 We used the Durbin-Watson Statistic to detect for the presence of autocorrelation. 
Hard-to-Borrow and Empirical Results
From the previous section we see that shorting LETFs produces slippage and thus makes money. In order to see the full picture and to determine the economics of these funds, we consider the cost of shorting thse LETFs. We consider the borrowing rates for each pair-trade in basis points per year 15 . 
Conclusion
LETFs are unique in that the fund managers must always rebalance their positions.
These funds use total return swaps at near market close each day in order to maintain the proper leverage. Fund managers rebalance their positions in the same direction as the underlying index. This predictable daily rebalancing by managers causes frictions in the market which in turn negatively impact the returns of LETFs. Since LETFs mandates'
are publicly known and are usually very large, the market absorbs this information and managers get poorer prices for the assets and contracts they have to buy.
We constructed shorting trades in order to capture any existing slippage. Our data confirmed our expectations and unequivocally showed that the cumulative effect of rebalancing costs cannot be ignored. Even for holding periods of one day, after accounting for compounding costs, LETFs fail to perform as expected. This is especially true for longer holding periods and for periods of high volatility.
In order to gain a full understanding of the performance of these trades, it was crucial to take into account the borrowing rates for shorting LETFs. We calculated the difference between the slippage and the borrowing rates. In 16 out of the 21 trades we found that the mean value of the difference is strictly positive with 95 percent confidence. Precisely because LETFs have negative expected returns with respect to their benchmark index, if they are not offset by high borrowing costs, then systematic shorting yields an arbitrage opportunity 16 .
